The Paradox of Progress: How Multi-Party Democracy and Development Have Led to Growing Instability in Somaliland
Markus Virgil Hoehne and Jethro Norman
8 May 2026
Credit: stock.adobe.com / Matyas Rehak
On 26 December 2025, Israel recognised Somaliland, the only state so far to do so. In the wake of this, the strategic and regional implications were discussed. We ask about the internal situation in which this recognition happened. In Hargeysa there were celebrations. But 400 km east, in Lasanod, the news landed very differently. Somaliland has not controlled Lasanod since August 2023, when a Dhulbahante-led uprising pushed its forces out of roughly a third of the de facto state’s territory. The paradox is that the foreign investment and diplomatic engagement which made recognition thinkable in the first place is also what shattered the polity it was supposed to consolidate.
Somaliland is generally represented as a beacon of stability and hope, praised for its original hybrid political order, (relatively) democratic elections, strong internal legitimacy, and absence of violence. It is also presented as ‘the country that does not exist’, but should exist in the view of some scholars and supporters who lament the lack of international recognition. Yet, the claim about the lack of external engagement with Somaliland no longer holds: recent years have seen a marked increase in international aid, economic investment, and diplomatic engagement, fuelling hopes of recognition. While these successes remain significant, much of the literature downplays dissenting voices within Somaliland, including challenges to democratization and opposition to Somaliland’s independence. We argue that internal opposition has increased in tandem with external investments and, related to that, hopes for international recognition.
Somaliland’s statehood emerged from the collapse of the Somali dictatorship in 1991. The insurgency that brought it down was led, in northern Somalia, by the Somali National Movement (SNM). The SNM was dominated by members of the Isaaq clan. Other clans in the region, including the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli in the north-east, had sided with the Barre regime until the end. Somaliland’s declaration of independence in May 1991 was pushed through by the Isaaq majority, and non-Isaaq consent was thin from the start.
While Mogadishu descended into chaos, the people in Somaliland began to work for peace and political stabilisation in their home areas. At first, they had very little there. The region had been devastated by the civil war of the 1980s. Many residents had fled. Nevertheless, the local population invested what little they had. Drawing on Somali traditions of conflict resolution and governance, an increasingly effective state system was built up over several years. Family heads, known as elders, played a key role as mediators between conflicting parties. Now the task was to find new common ground in a setting split along clan-lines on political orientations. The institutions of the emerging state included members of all kinship groups, selected by their respective elders. It is important to note here that Somali society is a clan-based society. People identify first and foremost as members of patrilineal descent groups, and political stability depends on all groups being represented in the system to a degree they find acceptable. Clan proportional representation within the state and conflict mediation based on Somali customary law in combination with economic self-reliance was the foundation of stability in Somaliland in the 1990s.
A new constitution was adopted in 2001. It provided for the establishment of political parties and regular elections. External observers viewed this as a step toward genuine democratization. In the years that followed, a series of elections took place, ranging from the local to the national level. These were praised by observers as largely fair and transparent. However, as early as the beginning of the 2000s, a shift in the political balance in Somaliland began that was barely noticeable at first. Since an important clan group, the Isaaq, makes up about two-thirds of the population and holds key positions in all parties, a disproportionately large number of Isaaq won in every election. Over the years, members of this “major clan” took over the state in all important areas. In addition, the Isaaq populate central Somaliland, including the port city of Berbera. Consequently, members of this clan benefited particularly strongly from Somaliland’s economic boom. Starting in 2015, for example, the United Arab Emirates-based company Dubai Port World (DPWorld) invested heavily in the expansion of the deep-sea port in Berbera. In cooperation with the Ethiopian government, the road connection from the port through Somaliland’s capital, Hargeysa, to Ethiopia was also expanded. Ethiopia is a landlocked country with over 100 million inhabitants. The connection to the port of Berbera is therefore of great strategic importance to the government in Addis Ababa. To date, hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars have been invested in the development of the so-called “Berbera Corridor,” primarily by Emirati partners. This has led to a noticeable economic upswing in Central Somaliland. However, it is almost exclusively the Isaaq, who also dominate politically, who have benefited from this.
This development led to growing discontent in the outlying regions. In eastern Somaliland in particular, people began to distance themselves from the government in Hargeysa. The eastern regions account for approximately 30 percent of the country’s territory. In the 1980s, the majority of the people living there had supported the government in Mogadishu against the rebels. In 2007, the Somaliland government forcibly occupied Lasanod, the most important city in the east. In the years that followed, there were several attempts by the local population—most of whom belong to the Dhulbahante clan—to violently shake off Somaliland’s administration. But the local militias stood no chance against the Somaliland army. This did not change until late 2022. In December, young people demonstrated against the government in Hargeysa. Somaliland security forces including Rapid Reaction Unit (RRU) forces that previously had received training by the UK opened fire, killing and injuring several dozen people. In response, the population rose up. Between February and August 2023, thousands of insurgents fought against Somaliland’s troops in and around Lasanod. Help also came from other parts of Somalia and from the diaspora. The fighting was seen as an opportunity to push back against Somaliland’s secessionist aspirations, which are still rejected by many Somalis today. On August 25, 2023, the Somaliland army was forced to withdraw from all eastern territories. Since then, a front line has run right through the middle of Somaliland.
The 2023 conflict over Lasanod was not merely a conflict over territorial control but—at its core—a conflict over political orientations and the future of Somalia. The anti-secessionist sentiment in the east was fueled by the political and economic developments outlined above, which led to a one-sided shift of power in favor of the Isaaq. In retrospect, it is evident that, paradoxically, the introduction of a multiparty system in Somaliland beginning in 2001 led to a decline in the previously consensus-based democracy rooted in clan proportional representation. Clan-based proportional representation ensured that all groups (including the opposition) were represented in the state to a relatively fair extent. With multiparty democracy, Somaliland has gradually transformed into a “single-clan state.” Although there are several parties in Somaliland, the Isaaq dominate them all, and in the absence of real ideological differences between those parties, voters in Somaliland tend to vote along clan-lines. In other words: no matter the election outcome, the Isaaq are always “at the helm” and expand their power. This, combined with competition over externally generated resources, leads to significant instability within the state.
Recognition, when it finally arrived, did not complete Somaliland’s state-building project. It actually revealed how fragile that project had become. Lasanod today is the capital of the newly founded North East State that is part of Somalia. Somaliland, despite Israel’s recognition, which did not trigger recognition by other states, continues to exist as de facto state; yet its state territory effectively shrunk.
Author bio
Markus Virgil Hoehne (markus.hoehne@uni-goettingen.de) is a Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of Goettingen, Germany. Jethro Norman (jeno@diis.dk) is Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen, Denmark. Both are published authors who have conducted long-term field research in northern Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland) over the past years.
